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In New York suppression of evidence is only appropriate where it is mandated by 
constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority, even if obtained by unethical or 
unlawful means.  The courts have been split on how to apply this standard to 
evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA.  In the case In re Miguel M., the New York 
Court of Appeals addressed this question for the first time, finding that such 
evidence should be suppressed.   Because it is the first authoritative case in New 
York addressing the evidentiary impact of a HIPAA violation, it is tempting to read 
Miguel M. as creating a new evidentiary rule.  The decision, however, was drafted 
very narrowly in the context of a hearing to compel assisted outpatient treatment 
under Kendra’s Law.  Accordingly, Miguel M. should not be interpreted as a bar to 
the admission of medical evidence obtained in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
in other types of cases.   Rather, it suggests that courts consider the type of 
proceeding, the type of medical evidence at issue, the identity of the parties, and the 
reason for the introduction of the evidence when determining whether suppression is 
appropriate.  In this manner In re Miguel M. can be harmonized with existing 
jurisprudence and be used to provide more equitable outcomes for litigants. 
                                                            
* The author would like to thank Kara J. Miller and Alessandra F. Zorgniotti for their valuable 
input on this article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act Privacy Rule1 (“HIPAA Privacy Rule”) in 2000, attorneys and courts have been 
scrambling to determine its impact on the admissibility of various types of medical 
evidence.  This is particularly the case where parties have obtained medical evidence 
without a HIPAA authorization form which they seek to introduce in court.  In New 
York, most courts have avoided addressing such HIPAA violations by falling back 
on the physician-patient privilege.2 Of the handful of New York’s lower courts 
which have addressed the issue, most have followed the majority opinion of other 
states, finding suppression for violations to be inappropriate.3    
On May 19, 2011, New York’s highest court reached a different conclusion.4  In 
the case In re Miguel M., after a party introduced medical records it had obtained 
from hospitals without the patient’s authorization in a hearing to compel that patient 
to receive assisted outpatient treatment, the Court of Appeals found those records 
should have been suppressed. While the Court of Appeals found suppression 
appropriate for the HIPAA violations in Miguel M., it provided scant analysis of the 
issue and limited its decision to the facts of the case. Accordingly, Miguel M. should 
not be construed as creating a bright line rule of evidence prohibiting all evidence 
obtained without the requisite HIPAA authorization. It is, however, the first decision 
by the Court of Appeals on the issue, and necessarily will be looked to as precedent. 
This Article puts Miguel M. into the context of pre-existing caselaw and suggests 
how it can be used as guidance in determining whether suppression is appropriate in 
various types of cases. 
Part I of this Article explains the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
provides a background on suppression of evidence, and reviews the prior cases 
which have addressed whether suppression is an appropriate remedy for HIPAA 
violations. Part II describes the trial court, appellate court, and Court of Appeals 
decisions in Miguel M.  The Court of Appeals decision is then analyzed in Part III, 
which also proposes how the holding of the case should be applied in civil, criminal, 
and administrative hearings. Finally, this Article concludes that In re Miguel M. 
should be narrowly applied and should not create a new rule of evidence dictating 
that evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA be per se inadmissible in New York 
courts. 
                                                            
 1 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).  
 2 See, e.g., Only Props. LLC v. Beaven, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2171 (Civ. Ct. 2011); 
Hozle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
 3 See, e.g., Valli v. Viviani, 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 2005); Matter of MacLeman, 808 
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
 4 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011). 
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I.  PRIOR LAW: 
A.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule  
In 1996, the legislature enacted the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).5  HIPAA’s stated purpose is “to improve the Medicare 
program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program under 
title XIX of such Act, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, 
by encouraging the development of a health information system through the 
establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of 
certain health information.”6  Indeed, one of the Parts added to the United States 
Code under HIPAA is titled “Administrative Simplification.”7  Prior to HIPAA’s 
enactment healthcare providers and insurance companies had to follow a complex 
patchwork of privacy laws that differed from state to state.8  In order to accomplish 
its goal of administrative simplification, the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) created “a national framework 
for health privacy protection”9 which has become known as the HIPAA “Privacy 
Rule.”10   
Under the Privacy Rule, in most circumstances a “covered entity” may not 
disclose “protected health information” without an “authorization.”11  Protected 
                                                            
 5 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
U.S. Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 18, 26, 29 and 42 of 
the U.S. Code); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2(d),  1320d-3(a) (2011). 
 6 42 U.S.C. § 1320d note (2011) (Purpose); see also HIPAA pmbl., 110 U.S. Stat. at 1936 
(“An Act . . . to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group 
and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care 
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care 
services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other 
purposes.”). 
 7 42 U.S.C. pt. C (2011). 
 8 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“While virtually every 
state has enacted one or more laws to safeguard privacy, these laws vary significantly from 
state to state and typically apply to only part of the health care system. Many states have 
adopted laws that protect the health information relating to certain health conditions such as 
mental illness, communicable diseases, cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other stigmatized 
conditions.”). 
 9 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82463; Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2005) (the regulations were  
meant to “provide a federal baseline for privacy protection”); Kish v. Graham, 833 N.Y.S.2d 
313, 357 (App. Div. 2007) (Pine, dissent), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Arons v. 
Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831 (N.Y. 2007) (“The enactment of HIPAA in 1996 was spawned by 
the economic efficiency of using electronic technology in transmitting medical records and the 
concomitant need to formulate national standards to protect the confidentiality of those 
records”). 
 10 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2012). 
 11 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2012); see also Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 840-41; People v. 
Bercume, 789 N.Y.S.2d 664, 668 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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health information (“PHI”) includes information created or received by healthcare 
providers relating to the physical or mental health of a patient or the provision of 
healthcare to a patient, which could be used to identify the patient.12  A patient’s oral 
statements to covered entities are included in this definition.13  Authorizations are not 
required for the release of PHI when the information is requested through a court or 
administrative order,14 nor are they required to respond to a subpoena, discovery 
request, or other lawful process if the covered entity has received satisfactory 
assurances that the party seeking disclosure has made reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the patient has been given notice of the request or has made reasonable efforts to 
secure a qualified protective order from a court or administrative tribunal.15 The 
Privacy Rule contains additional exceptions to the authorization requirement, 
including: disclosures required by law;16 disclosures to public health authorities for 
preventing or controlling disease, injury or disability, and for the conduct of public 
health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions;17 
disclosures to health oversight agencies for oversight activities authorized by law;18 
and disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety to persons reasonably able 
to prevent or lessen the threat.19 
In general, the Privacy Rule expressly preempts any contrary provisions in state 
law.20 However, state law is not preempted when the Secretary of Health has 
determined that it is necessary to prevent fraud related to the provision of or payment 
for health care; to ensure appropriate state regulation of insurance or health plans; for 
the reporting on health care delivery and costs; or for purposes of serving a 
compelling need related to public health or safety.21 In addition, state law is not 
preempted where its privacy provisions are more stringent than those imposed by the 
Privacy Rule.22 Nor is state law preempted where it establishes procedures for the 
reporting of disease or injury for the conduct of public health surveillance, 
investigation, or intervention.23 
HIPAA expressly provides for remedies in the event of a violation.  Remedies 
include civil penalties ranging from $100 to $50,000, the amount depending on the 
mental state of the violator (unknowing versus willful neglect) and whether the 
                                                            
 12 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012).  
 13 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82539. 
 14 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (2012). 
 15 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii). 
 16 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a).  
 17 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i). 
 18 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(d). 
 19 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j). 
 20 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2012). 
 21 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a)(1). 
 22 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b); 42 U.S.C. §1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2011). 
 23 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c). 
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violation has been corrected.24  Intentional violations of HIPAA can also lead to 
criminal penalties of up to $250,000 in fines and up to ten years imprisonment.25  In 
contrast to other federal legislation addressing privacy concerns,26 HIPAA does not 
provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its provisions.  
Following queries regarding the use of suppression as a remedy, the Secretary 
responded: “We do not have the authority to mandate that courts apply or not apply 
the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of the regulation. This issue is 
in the purview of the courts.”27   
B.  Suppression 
In New York, “absent some constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority 
mandating the suppression of otherwise valid evidence, such evidence will be 
admissible”28 even if procured by “unethical or unlawful means.”29   Courts have 
applied this rule in several types of proceedings.  For example, in Radder v. CSX 
Transportation, Inc., a personal injury action, the Fourth Department of New York’s 
                                                            
 24 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2011). 
 25 42 U.S.C. §1320d-6(b) (2011). 
 26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2011) (prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act "in any trial, hearing, arbitration, or other 
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, 
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision 
of a State"); 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2011) (prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Wiretap Act “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the 
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.”). 
 27 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462, 82596 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also 65 Fed. Reg. at 82679 (“[U]nder the HIPAA statutory 
authority, we cannot impose sanctions on law enforcement officials or require suppression of 
evidence. We must therefore rely on rules that regulate disclosure of protected health 
information by covered entities in the first instance.”). 
 28 Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting 
Heimanson v. Farkas, 738 N.Y.S.2d 894, 894 (App. Div. 2002)); see also Cohens v. Hess, 705 
N.E.2d. 1202, 1204 (N.Y. 1998) (“all facts having rational probative value are admissible, 
unless some specific rule forbids.” (quoting Wigmore, Evidence §10, at 667(Tillers rev. 
1983))). 
 29 Stagg v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 1990); see 
also People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1281 (N.Y. 2007) (“Our decisions make clear that a 
violation of a statute does not, without more, justify suppressing the evidence to which that 
violation leads”); People v. Wilder, 712 N.E.2d 652, 654 (N.Y. 1999) (“all evidence that has 
any tendency in reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, is 
relevant and admissible unless its admission would violate some exclusionary rule.”); 
Mosallem v. Berenson, 905  N.Y.S.2d 575, 581 (App. Div. 2010) (“in the absence of some 
constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority, such evidence is admissible in a civil 
proceeding even if obtained by wrongful means.”); People v. Liggan, 878 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 
(App. Div. 2009) (“The exclusionary rule applies to a violation of a statute only where the 
purpose of the statute is to effectuate a constitutionally protected right.”). 
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Appellate Division30 declined to suppress evidence which had been obtained by 
virtue of a violation of former DR 7-104 of New York’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility (which prohibited lawyers from communicating with an individual on 
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a 
lawyer), noting “[h]ere, there is no constitutional, statutory or case law authority 
mandating the suppression of Pauley's otherwise valid testimony. . . .”31  Similarly, 
in Matter of Quadon H., a juvenile delinquency proceeding, where the defendant’s 
fingerprints were matched to fingerprints in the police database, which should have 
been destroyed pursuant to Family Court Act § 354.1, the Second Department of 
New York’s Appellate Division declined to suppress the defendant’s inculpatory 
statements that would not have been obtained but for the fingerprint match.32  In so 
finding, the court reasoned that “the right conferred on the respondent pursuant to 
Family Court Act § 354.1 to have his fingerprints destroyed does not implicate 
fundamental constitutional interests or considerations.  Hence, the violation of 
Family Court Act § 354.1, ‘does not, without, more, justify suppressing of evidence 
to which that violation leads.’”33  The New York Court of Appeals used the same 
reasoning in Charles Q. v. Constantine, where the records from an officer’s criminal 
proceeding, which should have been sealed pursuant to section 160.50 of the New 
York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”), were erroneously used in the officer’s 
disciplinary proceeding.34  The Court noted a prior decision in which it found that 
violations of CPL § 160.50 do not implicate constitutional considerations and would 
not require suppression in a criminal proceeding.35  Thus, the Court reasoned, 
“[h]aving concluded that evidence obtained in violation of a CPL 160.50 sealing 
order need not be suppressed in a criminal proceeding, we discern no basis for 
excluding from a disciplinary hearing evidence obtained through an erroneous 
unsealing order.”36   
In terms of HIPAA violations, as previously mentioned HIPAA itself provides no 
authority for suppression,37 and the only statute that can serve as a basis for 
suppression is limited to specific situations in civil trials.  Since 2003, section 
3122(a) of New York’s Civil Procedure Law and Rules (“CPLR”) has required 
written HIPAA authorizations to accompany subpoenas duces tecum for patients’ 
                                                            
 30 In New York, appeals from trial courts (officially called Supreme Courts), go to the 
Appellate Division, which is divided into four departments based on location, appeals from 
the appellate division go to the New York Court of Appeals (which is the highest court in New 
York). 
 31 Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (App. Div. 2009); see also 
Heimanson v. Farkas, 738 N.Y.S.2d 894, 894 (App. Div. 2002) (finding evidence admissible 
even though obtained because of a DR 7-104 violation). 
 32 In re Quadon H., 866 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Div. 2008). 
 33 Id. at 695 (quoting People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1281 (N.Y. 2007). 
 34 In re Charles Q. v. Constantine, 650 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 1995). 
 35 Id. at 840 (citing People v. Patterson, 587 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1991)). 
 36 Id. at 840. 
 37 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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medical records.38  This provision in CPLR § 3122 ensures that the procurement of 
medical records via subpoenas complies with HIPAA’s requirement that the patient 
be on notice.39  Under section 3103(c) of the CPLR, “if any disclosure under [Article 
31 of the CPLR] has been improperly or irregularly obtained so that a substantial 
right of a party is prejudiced” the court may issue a suppression order.40  Because the 
requirement for HIPAA authorizations is in Article 31 of the CPLR, section 3103(c) 
provides statutory authority for a court to suppress information obtained via 
subpoena without the requisite notice to patients when substantial rights are 
prejudiced.  
The term “substantial right” as used in CPLR 3103(c) is more inclusive than 
constitutional rights.41  Thus, New York courts have found that violations of the 
CPLR affecting such rights as privacy in financial and medical records,42 and the 
attorney-client privilege,43 are cause for suppression.  Such was also the result in 
Muzio v. Napolitano, where the Second Department issued a protective order 
pursuant to CPLR 3103(c) precluding the defendant from calling petitioner’s treating 
physician because the defendant had conducted an interview of the physician without 
a valid HIPAA authorization.44   
Suppression under CPLR 3103(c) is discretionary, however, and even where 
information is obtained by improper means, suppression is not warranted where the 
party would be entitled to discovery of the information improperly obtained.45  For 
example, in the case In re Estate of Kochovos, the First Department affirmed the 
surrogate court’s denial of suppression when the contestants issued subpoenas duces 
tecum on various banks and two doctors commanding attendance at depositions and 
the production of certain records, without notifying the proponent.46  The court noted 
that though it disapproved of the contestants’ tactics, “[n]one of the material 
obtained was privileged, and there is no showing that counsel would not have been 
entitled to obtain the documents at issue in the normal course of discovery, properly 
                                                            
 38 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122 (Consol.2012) (“A medical provider served with a subpoena duces 
tecum requesting the production of a patient's medical records pursuant to this rule need not 
respond or object to the subpoena if the subpoena is not accompanied by a written 
authorization by the patient. Any subpoena served upon a medical provider requesting the 
medical records of a patient shall state in conspicuous bold-faced type that the records shall 
not be provided unless the subpoena is accompanied by a written authorization by the 
patient.”). 
 39 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 40 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(c) (Consol. 2012). 
 41 Henriques v. Boitano, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *4-5 (Civ. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999), 
aff’d, 800 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Term 2000). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Parnes v. Parnes, 915 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 2011); Surgical Design Corp. v. Correa, 
799 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App. Div. 2005). 
 44 Muzio v. Napolitano, 919 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65-66 (App. Div. 2011). 
 45 Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 2003); Gutierrez v. Dudock, 
715 N.Y.S.2d 333, (App. Div. 2000); DiMarco v. Sparks, 624 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (App. Div. 
1995). 
 46 In re Estate of Kochovos, 528 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1988). 
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conducted.”47 Accordingly, it found the surrogate court had properly denied 
suppression.48 Likewise, in Santiago v. N.D. Enterprises, Inc., though it was 
undisputed that the HIPAA forms the defendant used to obtain the plaintiff’s medical 
records had been altered, the Appellate Term found that suppression of the records 
was not appropriate under CPLR 3103 because there was no prejudice to the plaintiff 
who had waived the physician-patient privilege.49 
Whether it is appropriate to suppress HIPAA violations under constitutional 
authority is more problematic as it is less clear whether the constitutional right to 
privacy is implicated by violations of the Privacy Rule. As noted by the United 
States Supreme Court, “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy,” however “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy,” is implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty.50  This right to privacy “is not a ‘bright line’ concept”51 and the United States 
Supreme Court has traditionally only found it to encompass matters relating to 
marriage,52 procreation,53 contraception,54 family relationships,55 and child rearing 
and education.56 The Court has avoided ruling on whether it extends to 
confidentiality in health information.57  Accordingly, court decisions on the issue are 
                                                            
 47 Id. at 38. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Santiago v. N.D. Enter., Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 667 (App. Term 2008). 
 50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
 51 Ritterband v. Axelrod, 562 N.Y.S.2d 605, 611 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (citing Crosby v. State 
Workers’ Comp. Bd., 442 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-94 (N.Y. 1982)). 
 52 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a ban on interracial 
marriage). 
 53 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (invalidating a state law which provided for compulsory sterilization after a third 
conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude) 
 54 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning a conviction under a law 
banning the distribution of contraceptives); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(striking down a ban on the use  of contraceptives) 
 55 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a zoning 
ordinance which limited occupancy of residences to members of a “family” and provided a 
narrow definition of “family”). 
 56 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law that prohibited 
the teaching of foreign language to young children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (striking down a law requiring children to attend public schools).  See also Planned 
Parenthood of Southern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
713 (1976); Doe v. Axelrod, 136 A.D2d 410, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Eichner, 426 
N.Y.S.2d 517, 538 (App. Div. 1980). 
 57 Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Bioethics: Constitutional Right to 
Informational Health Privacy in Critical Condition, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 283 (2011); 
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“assum[ing], without deciding, that the 
Constitution protects a privacy right” in medical information); Whalen v. Roe,  429 U.S. 589, 
605-06 (1977) (stating that the state’s ability to collect medical information typically is 
accompanied by a statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures which 
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less than clear.  For example, in Doe v. City of New York,58 the Second Circuit found 
that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to privacy in his HIV status.  Likewise, in 
Powell v. Schriver, the court held that postoperative transsexuals “possess a 
constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality” about their status.59 And in 
O’Connor v. Pierson 60 the court found that a school employee had “a protected 
privacy right in the medical records” relating to his substance-abuse treatment.  In 
contrast, however, the Second Circuit has recently found that a woman’s 
fibromyalgia status is not covered by any constitutional right to privacy.61 In so 
finding, the court explained that “the interest in the privacy of medical information 
will vary with the condition.”62  It clarified that the outcome in O’Connor “does not 
suggest that a third party’s disclosure of one particular medical condition in every 
case violates the right to privacy.  Indeed, the ‘privacy of certain medical conditions’ 
has been ‘constitutionalized’ only ‘within narrow parameters.’”63 Noting that privacy 
protections should only attach to serious medical conditions carrying a social stigma, 
the court found that constitutional rights to privacy in medical conditions should be 
determined “on a case-by-case basis.”64 
Even assuming there is a constitutional right to privacy in medical records, 
however, New York courts have noted that “[a] statute may be based on privacy 
considerations and yet not implicate the constitutional right to privacy.”65 To 
determine whether the constitutional right is implicated, New York courts have 
looked to the purpose and history behind a statute.66  For instance, the Court of 
Appeals has found that the physician-patient privilege serves three core policy 
objectives: (1) “to maximize unfettered patient communication with medical 
professionals, so that any potential embarrassment arising from public disclosure 
will not ‘deter people from seeking medical help and securing adequate diagnosis 
and treatment,’” (2) to encourage “medical professionals to be candid in recording 
confidential information in patient medical records,” and (3) to protect “patients' 
reasonable privacy expectations against disclosure of sensitive personal 
information.”67  In People v. Greene, the First Department found that there was 
                                                            
“arguably has its roots in the Constitution,” but finding it need not determine that issue on the 
facts before it). 
 58 Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 59 Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 60 O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 61 Matson v. Board of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 62 Id. at 64 (citing Powell, 175 F.3d at 111). 
 63 Id. at 66 (quoting Powell, 175 F.3d at 112.). 
 64 Id. at 66-67. 
 65 People v. Greene, 824 N.Y.S.2d 48, 55 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 
2007). 
 66 N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Morgenthau (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 779 
N.E.2d 173 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 2007); People v. 
Patterson, 587 N.E.2d 255, 257, (N.Y. 1991). 
 67 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 779 N.E.2d at 175; see also Camperlengo v. Blum, 436 
N.E.2d 1299, 1300 (N.Y. 1982); Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 113-31 (N.Y. 1989). 
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“nothing in these core objectives ‘indicating a legislative intent to confer a 
constitutionally derived substantial right’” and accordingly ruled that information 
about a defendant divulged by a hospital administrator was admissible even if it 
violated the physician-patient privilege.68  The Court of Appeals affirmed this 
analysis, stating “[t]here is no constitutional right to privacy in physician-patient 
communications.”69  Similarly, in an earlier decision addressing the admissibility of 
a surgeon’s disclosure of drugs discovered during surgery, the First Department 
stated “with respect to this latter claim of infringement of constitutional rights, we 
note that the privilege embodied in CPLR 4504(a) is not of constitutional 
dimension.”70  The Fourth Department has also stated that “[t]he physician-patient 
privilege is based on statute, not the State or Federal Constitution,” and accordingly 
found that suppression of evidence to which the violation had led was unnecessary.71   
Like the physician-patient privilege, the primary purpose behind the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule was not to protect individuals’ constitutional rights to privacy.  Rather, 
the goal was administrative simplification.72  To reach this goal, the Secretary 
designed the Privacy Rule: 
(1) To protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them 
access to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of 
that information;  
(2) to improve the quality of health care in the U.S. by restoring trust in 
the health care system among consumers, health care professionals, and 
the multitude of organizations and individuals committed to the delivery 
of care; and  
(3) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by 
creating a national framework for health privacy protection that builds on 
efforts by states, health systems, and individual organizations and 
individuals.73 
Thus, like the physician-patient privilege, the Privacy Rule is not primarily aimed 
at the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of government interference with an 
individual’s liberty.  And like violations of the physician-patient privilege, the 
constitutional right to privacy is not necessarily implicated by violations of the 
Privacy Rule. 
                                                            
 68 Greene, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (quoting Patterson, 587 N.E.2d at 257). 
 69 Greene, 879 N.E.2d at 1281; see also People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43, 44 n.1 (N.Y. 
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974) (noting that the physician-patient privilege is “not 
one of constitutional magnitude.”). 
 70 People v. Figueroa, 568 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1991). 
 71 People v. Bryant, 900 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Greene, 879 
N.E.2d at 1281); see also People v. Sergio, 864 N.Y.S.2d 264, 278-79 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“The 
principal purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege relates to facilitating full disclosure by 
the patient, not protection of the patient's constitutional privacy rights or any other 
constitutional right.”). 
 72 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 73 Id.  
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C.  Prior Cases Addressing the Applicability of Suppression to HIPAA Violations 
Since the passage of the Privacy Rule, New York’s supreme courts have had to 
address the issue of suppression as it relates to medical information obtained without 
the requisite HIPAA authorization.  One of the first attempts was made by the 
Richmond County Supreme Court in Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center.74   
Keshecki was a medical malpractice case in which the defense counsel discussed the 
plaintiff’s medical condition with her treating physician without first obtaining a 
HIPAA authorization form.  In addressing the HIPAA violation, the court reasoned 
that:  “HIPAA protects that privacy of the plaintiff, and this court must protect that 
right.  The only adequate remedy is to preclude any evidence obtained contrary to 
those safeguards.”75  The court went on to detail what must be included in a HIPAA 
authorization in order for an attorney to have private discussions with a party’s 
physician.76  Likewise, in Matter of Derek, Broome County’s Surrogate Court 
precluded treating physicians’ affirmations from a guardianship proceeding where 
they failed to observe the physician-patient privilege as well as HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule.77 
Other New York courts have criticized Richmond County’s approach and 
reached the opposite conclusion.  For example in Valli v. Viviani, the Suffolk County 
Supreme Court stated: 
what the decision in Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center has done is 
place the onus to enforce HIPAA upon the trial justice.  Should a doctor’s 
testimony be precluded at trial because he or she granted an interview 
pursuant to a trial subpoena without obtaining the assurances required by 
HIPAA?... Certainly the conditions set forth in Keshecki are a judicial 
attempt to preemptively set forth what one court deems compliance with 
the federal regulation… this court declines to follow the holding…78   
Likewise, the Niagara County Supreme Court stated that “. . . the Keshecki court 
also imposed a HIPAA based remedy by granting plaintiff’s motion to preclude the 
testimony of two treating physicians.  This Court finds nothing under New York law 
or HIPAA bestowing such rights or authorizing such a remedy.”79  Similarly, the 
New York County Supreme Court,80 the Kings County Family Court,81 the 
                                                            
 74 Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 75 Id. at 305.  
 76 Id. at 304.  
 77  Matter of Derek, 821 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Sur. Ct. 2006). 
 78 Valli v. Viviani, 801 N.Y.S.2d 243, 243 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
 79 Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
 80 Perry v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 122908/01, slip op at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 
Feb. 16, 2005); see also Crystal v. Constantino, No. 0106552/2003, slip op at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cnty.  Jan. 27 2005) (“Although defense counsel acknowledged non-compliance with 
HIPAA, the Court is not satisfied that preclusion is the most fair remedy.”). 
 81 Matter of B. Children, 886 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Fam. Ct. 2009) (“While HIPAA regulates 
disclosure of medical information by medical providers and establishes a uniform reporting 
system for health facilities, its privacy provisions are procedural in nature and do not create 
any new privileges.”) 
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Westchester County Surrogate Court,82 and the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York83 have each concluded that HIPAA does not create any 
new physician–patient privilege. 
The decisions of New York’s lower courts mimic those of federal courts and the 
majority of other states’ courts which have addressed the issue.  In refusing to 
suppress improperly obtained medical evidence, the most common analysis points to 
the fact that HIPAA provides its own remedies and suppression is not among them.  
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found “suppression of the evidence is not the 
proper remedy for a HIPAA violation . . . HIPAA expressly provides for monetary 
fines in the event of a violation.  Thus, the proper remedy for a HIPAA violation is a 
monetary fine, consistent with the express provisions of the statute.”84  Likewise the 
Florida District Court of Appeals stated, “[e]ven where evidence is disclosed by a 
covered entity in violation of HIPAA standards, suppression of the records is not 
provided for by HIPAA and is thus not a proper remedy.”85  Similar statements have 
been made by the Supreme Court of Georgia,86 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,87 
the Indiana Court of Appeals,88 the Kansas Court of Appeals,89 the Illinois Appeals 
Court,90 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana,91 the Michigan Court of Appeals,92 the 
                                                            
 82 In re Estate of MacLeman, 808 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (Declining to follow 
Keshecki, noting that “… HIPAA did not create any substantive rights or remedies in the 
courts”). 
 83 EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338, at *8 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
16, 2004) (“The court notes that HIPAA’s limitations on the ways in which health information 
may be released is separate and apart from any claim of privilege that the plaintiff may have 
had or waived.”). 
 84 State v. Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 878-79 (Idaho 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 85 State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 86 Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 2008) (“The remedies for HIPAA violations 
are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5.  That section merely authorizes the Secretary to impose a 
fine not to exceed $100 for each violation. It does not authorize a remedy or penalty in the 
context of a civil lawsuit.”). 
 87 State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶ 13, 745 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(“HIPAA does not provide for suppression of the evidence as a remedy for a HIPAA 
violation.  Suppression is warranted only when evidence has been obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights or if a statute specifically provides for suppression as a 
remedy.”). 
 88 State v. Eichhorst, 879 N.E.2d 1144, 1154-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“HIPAA provides 
for civil and criminal penalties for improper disclosures of medical information … [the 
defendant] cites no authority for the proposition that evidence given in violation of HIPAA 
should be suppressed or excluded in a criminal setting.  HIPAA does not contain such a 
remedy.”) 
 89 State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that regardless of 
whether a HIPAA violation occurred, the defendant was not entitled to suppression because 
HIPAA did not provide for it as a remedy). 
 90 People v. Bauer,  931 N.E.2d 1283, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“Even if the grand jury 
subpoena had been insufficient pursuant to HIPAA’s law enforcement exception… the 
defendant fails to cite any authority which compels that medical information so obtained must 
be suppressed, and HIPAA does not contain such a remedy.”). 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,93 the United States District 
Court of Maryland,94 and the United States District Courts of Eastern and Southern 
California.95  
II.  IN RE MIGUEL M. 
A.  Background 
In the case In re Miguel M.,96 the New York Court of Appeals had its first 
opportunity to address the admissibility of medical evidence obtained in violation of 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  The case arose out of a Queens County hearing held 
pursuant to section 9.60 of the Mental Hygiene Law (“Kendra’s Law”) to order 
Assisted Outpatient Treatment (“AOT”) for Miguel M.97  Kendra’s Law is named for 
Kendra Webdale, who was killed when a mentally ill man, Andrew Goldstein, 
pushed her off a subway platform in January 1999. 98  In the two years prior to the 
fatal attack, Mr. Goldstein had attacked thirteen other individuals, most of whom 
were hospital workers or patients.99  Despite Mr. Goldstein’s history of violent 
behavior and his requests for treatment, he had been released by the state mental 
                                                            
 91 State v. Downs, 04-2402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 09/23/05); 923 So. 2d 726, 731(2005) 
(noting that if the complaint is that HIPAA was violated, the complainant “should file a 
complaint against the covered entity that disclosed the information.”). 
 92 Belote v. Strange, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2642, at *16-17 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005) 
(The remedies for failure to comply with the requirements and standards of HIPAA are found 
under 42 USC 1320d-5. However, these remedies do not address how courts [sic] should treat 
health information obtained in violation of its provisions. . . . As with every discovery 
violation, whether and in what manner the violation should be sanctioned is a matter 
committed to the sound discretion of the court.). 
 93 United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (“HIPAA does not provide 
any private right of action, much less a suppression remedy.”) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 94 United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 438 (D. Md. 2009) (“Neither Sutherland 
nor Kreshecki compel a finding that medical information obtained through the use of an 
improper subpoena under HIPAA’s law enforcement exception should be prohibited from use 
at trial… HIPAA itself does not provides that medical information so obtained must be 
suppressed.  The Court is unaware of any authority which compels the suppression of the 
records at trial.”); Law v. Zukerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (D. Md. 2004) (“Since HIPAA 
does not include any reference to how a court should treat such a violation [of HIPAA] during 
discovery or at trial, the type of remedy to be applied is within the discretion of the Court 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.”). 
 95 Frye v. Ayers, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124339, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2009) 
(“HIPAA does not provide for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for its violation.”); 
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Insurance Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029-30 (S.D. Cal. 2004) 
(noting that HIPAA has its own sanctions). 
 96 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011). 
 97 In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699  (App. Div. 2009). 
 98 Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 110; In re K.L, 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004). 
 99 David Rohde, Jury Still Considering Subway Killing Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
1999, at B2. 
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health system.100  At the time he pushed Ms. Webdale, he had stopped taking his 
anti-psychotic medication.101  Following the public outcry after Ms. Webdale’s 
death,102 the New York Legislature enacted Kendra’s Law, which was “designed to 
protect the public and individuals living with mental illness by ensuring potentially 
dangerous mentally ill outpatients are safely and effectively treated.”103 Under 
Kendra’s Law, an individual may be ordered to receive outpatient treatment if he or 
she meets the following criteria: the person is at least 18 years old; suffering from a 
mental illness; unlikely to survive in a community safely without supervision; has a 
history of failing to comply with treatment, which caused hospitalization at least 
twice within 36-months of the petition or caused one or more acts of serious violent 
behavior; as a result of the individual’s mental illness he or she is unlikely to 
voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment; assisted outpatient treatment is 
necessary to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would likely result in harm to 
the person or others; and assisted outpatient treatment is likely to benefit the 
person.104  A petition for an order authorizing AOT may be filed by anyone over 18 
years old who is living with the subject individual, or the parent spouse, sibling, or 
child of the subject individual.105  It may also be filed by specified professionals 
involved in treating the subject individual, as well as the director of community 
services, social services officials, or an individual’s parole officer.106  The petition 
must identify facts supporting the petitioner’s assertion that the individual meets the 
criteria for AOT.107 
B.  Trial Court Ruling  
The petition in Miguel M. was filed by Charles Barron, M.D., the Director of the 
Department of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital Center (“Elmhurst”), who was 
seeking to require Miguel M. to receive AOT.108  In support of the petition, Dr. 
Barron presented the testimony of Dr. Garza, the Director of AOT at Elmhurst.109  
                                                            
 100 Anemona Hartocollos, Nearly 8 Years Later, Guilty Plea in Subway Killing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at B1; David Rohde, Subway Killer Apologizes at Sentencing, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2000, at B1. 
 101 Anemona Hartocollis, Subway Victim’s Mother Speaks at Killer’s Sentencing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at B3. 
 102 Kathryn A. Worthington, Kendra's Law and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: An Empirical 
Peek Behind the Courts' Legal Analysis and a Suggested Template for the New York State 
Legislature's Reconsideration for Renewal in 2010, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 213, 221 
(2009); Jennifer Gutterman, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to 
Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2402 (2000). 
 103 Div. of Budget Rep. on Bills, B. Jacket,  N.Y. Laws 1999, ch. 408, at 15 (1999). 
 104  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (Consol. 2012).   
 105  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1)(i), (ii).   
 106  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1)(vii), (viii).   
 107  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(2).   
 108  In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (App. Div. 2009); In re Barron v. M.M., 852 
N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 109  Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
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As the Director of AOT, Dr. Garza’s duties included investigating and evaluating 
referrals to the Elmhurst AOT program.110  Dr. Garza testified that based on his 
evaluation of Miguel M. and a review of Miguel M.’s clinical records from Elmhurst 
and Holliswood Hospital, he diagnosed Miguel M. with schizoaffective disorder.  
His office had received the records after requesting them from the hospitals.111  It 
was uncontested that the records contained protected health information.112  It was 
also uncontested that Dr. Garza “was not the director of medical records for either of 
the hospitals, never obtained Miguel M.’s authorization to obtain the clinical records, 
and had not obtained a court order permitting him to obtain the clinical records.”113  
During Dr. Garza’s testimony petitioner sought to introduce the medical records into 
evidence.114  Thereafter, Miguel M.’s attorney made a motion to preclude the clinical 
records and Dr. Garza’s testimony regarding them as the records had been obtained 
in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.115 
After receiving briefs on the issue, the trial court denied the motion.116  While the 
court declined to find that the release of records was proper under 45 C.F.R. § 
164.512(a)(1), which permits disclosure of medical records where disclosure is 
required by law, the court found disclosure was proper under 45 C.F.R. § 
164.512(b)(1)(i).117  That section of the Privacy Rule permits disclosure “to a public 
health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such information for 
the purposes of preventing or controlling disease, . . . and the conduct of public 
health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions.”118  
The court found that Dr. Garza qualified as “a public health authority” and that the 
AOT program qualified as a “public health intervention” and “public health 
investigation.”119  Because the court found that the disclosures were authorized under 
HIPAA, it deemed the records admissible and relied heavily upon them in its 
judgment directing Miguel M. to receive and accept AOT for a period of six 
months.120 
C.  Second Department Decision 
On appeal, the Second Department of the New York State Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division reached the same conclusion.121  HIPAA defines “public health 
                                                            
 110  Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700. 
 111  Id.; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
 112  Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700. 
 113  Id. at 700-01. 
 114  Id. at 700. 
 115 Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 700.  
 116 Id. at 701. 
 117 Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
 118 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2012). 
 119 Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 702; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 700.  
 120 Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
 121 Id. at 704-05. 
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authority” as “an agency or authority of the United States, a State, a territory, a 
political subdivision . . .  or a person or entity acting under a grant of authority from 
or contract with such public agency, including the employees or agents of such 
public entity . . . that is responsible for public health matters as part of its official 
mandate”.122  The court reasoned that Dr. Garza qualified as a public health authority 
because his duties as the director of AOT included investigating and evaluating 
referrals to the AOT program.123  Such investigation was provided for in Kendra’s 
Law, which specifically authorized the director of AOT to obtain the medical records 
as part of its investigations.124  Citing the fact that the purpose of Kendra’s Law is to 
protect the public from persons with mental illness who pose a potential risk to 
public health and safety, the court reasoned that the AOT investigation qualified as a 
“public health investigation” and “public health intervention” under HIPAA.125  
Accordingly, the disclosure of Miguel M.’s medical records to Dr. Garza was 
authorized by HIPAA and suppression was not warranted.126   
The Second Department went on to note that even if the disclosures were not 
authorized by HIPAA, HIPAA did not preempt Kendra’s Law with respect to AOT 
investigations.127  HIPAA’s preemption provision specifically exempts 
circumstances in which “[t]he provision of State law, including State procedures 
established under such law, as applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or 
injury… or for the conduct of public health surveillance, investigation, or 
intervention”.128  Because HIPAA only preempts state law which is contrary to the 
Privacy Rule and the court had found that AOT investigations qualify as “public 
health investigations” or “public health interventions,” it found that Kendra’s Law 
was not preempted and AOT investigations were excepted from HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule.129 
D.  Court of Appeals Decision 
Before the Court of Appeals, Miguel M. again argued that Dr. Barron’s request 
for his medical records was too broad and should have been on notice.130  The 
records could have been obtained in a manner which complied with HIPAA (for 
example by seeking a court order or subpoena), but Dr. Barron did not bother to 
attempt any of them.131  This HIPAA violation should result in the suppression of the 
medical records because it would be unreasonable to allow a party to place the other 
                                                            
 122 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
 123 Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04. 
 124 Id. at 704. 
 125 Id. at 704-05. 
 126 Id. at 705. 
 127 Id. at 705-06. 
 128 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c). 
 129 Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
 130 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011). 
 131 Id. 
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party’s condition at issue and then seek to prove its prima facie case solely on the 
basis of improperly obtained records.132   
In response, Dr. Barron argued that the request for Miguel M.’s records was 
made pursuant to the Mental Health Law, which authorizes disclosure when a 
referral has been made to the AOT program.133  Dr. Barron contended that the AOT 
program is a public health activity, designed to protect the public from violent 
individuals, in the aggregate; in enacting Kendra’s Law the New York legislature 
found that there was a public problem with mentally ill individuals supervising their 
own medical care.134  Kendra’s Law was meant to make the treatment process more 
open, with greater communications between health facilities and the Department of 
Health.135 A requirement that AOT directors comply with HIPAA disclosure 
regulations would be unduly burdensome and result in fewer proceedings being 
brought.136  This would result in individuals not receiving needed treatment and 
possibly harming others.137  
Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that it was a stretch to read the 
language of the “public health” exception in the Privacy Rule to include AOT 
investigations.138  Looking to the intent behind the exception, the Court noted that its 
apparent purpose “is to facilitate government activities that protect large numbers of 
people from epidemics, environmental hazards, and the like, or that advance public 
health by accumulating valuable statistical information.”139  AOT investigations are 
not this type of activity.140  Thus, the Court ruled that AOT investigations were not 
within the scope of the exception, stating, “[t]o disclose private information about 
particular people, for the purpose of preventing those people from harming 
themselves or others, effects a very substantial invasion of privacy without the sort 
of generalized public benefit that would come from, for example, tracing the course 
of an infectious disease.”141  This conclusion, the Court reasoned, is bolstered by the 
fact that Dr. Barron could have invoked the provisions of the Privacy Rule 
permitting disclosure in response to an order from a court or administrative tribunal 
or a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process, all of which would have 
provided Miguel M. with notice and an opportunity to object.142 
After it determined that the Privacy Rule applied and that Dr. Barron had 
violated it, the Court then had to decide what impact it had on the admissibility of 
                                                            
 132  Oral Argument at 00:01-03:10,  In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (No. 76), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/2011/Mar11/Mar11_OA.htm. 
 133  Id. at 08:51. 
 134  Id. at 11:04. 
 135  Id. at 17:57. 
 136  Id. at 17:00. 
 137  Id. at 17:37. 
 138 In re Miguel M,, 950 N.E.2d 107, 111 (N.Y. 2011). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(e)(1)(i), (ii)). 
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the evidence.143  Dr. Barron argued that even if the disclosure was unlawful, 
suppression was inappropriate as HIPAA contains its own remedies for violations: 
civil penalties and, for the knowing and wrongful disclosure of covered information, 
fines and imprisonment.144 Dr. Barron cited state court decisions from Florida,145 
Kansas,146 and Wisconsin147 in support of his argument.148  In response, Miguel M. 
maintained that the remedies under HIPAA are limited to filing a complaint with the 
Secretary and thus are insufficient to address his situation.149  While other states have 
found suppression inapplicable to evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA, those 
cases are distinguishable in that they were all criminal cases where disclosure was 
made to law enforcement officials.150  Thus, Miguel M. argued, the Court should 
follow Keshecki151 and Matter of Derek152 which both found suppression to be an 
appropriate remedy in civil cases.153 
The Court agreed with Miguel M.154  It noted that, as was the case with violations 
of the doctor-patient privilege, in criminal cases a violation of HIPAA or the Privacy 
Rule does not always require the suppression of evidence.155  However, the Court 
continued, 
this case is different.  It is one thing to allow the use of evidence resulting 
from improper disclosure of information in medical records to prove that 
a patient has committed a crime; it is another to use the records 
themselves, or their contents, in a proceeding to subject to unwanted 
medical treatment a patient who is accused of no wrongdoing.  Using the 
records in that way directly impairs, without adequate justification, the 
                                                            
 143 Id. at 112. 
 144 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, 1320d-6). 
 145 State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla  Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 146 State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271, 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 147 State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶ 13, 745 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 148 Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 112; see also Oral Argument, supra note 132. 
 149 Oral Argument, supra note 132. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 152 Matter of Derek, 821 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sur. Ct. 2006).  
 153 While in oral argument Miguel M.’s counsel stated “we have at least three trial court 
decisions that all hold in the context of civil litigation … that records obtained in violation of 
HIPAA should be precluded,” he does not give any citations for those cases.  Scott M. Wells, 
Representative for Appellant, Oral Argument (Mar. 23, 2011).  His brief only cites Keshecki 
and Matter of Derek in support of this position.  Telephone Interview with Susan Dautal, 
Assistant Deputy Clerk, N.Y. Court of Appeals (Sept. 2, 2011). 
 154 In re Miguel M,, 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011). 
 155 Id. (citing People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 2007)). 
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interest protected by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule: the interest in keeping 
one’s own medical condition private.156 
Thus, the Court ruled that medical evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA is 
“not admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.”157 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Overall, the Court’s decision appears to be guided by the underlying assumption 
that Dr. Barron could have easily obtained Miguel M.’s medical records in 
compliance with HIPAA by issuing a subpoena.  The decision stressed that “it is far 
from our purpose to make enforcement of Kendra’s Law difficult,” but that Dr. 
Barron could have issued a subpoena, and that it would be “no great burden on the 
public agencies charged with enforcing Kendra’s Law to give patients a chance to 
object before records are delivered.”158  Notably, the first question during oral 
argument, asked by Justice Read within the first 35 seconds, was, “assuming we 
agree with you, are there other ways that the information can be obtained?”159 
Miguel M. responded that Dr. Barron could have obtained a court order or issued a 
subpoena.160  He later noted that issuing a subpoena for the records “wouldn’t be too 
hard.”161  When Justice Smith asked if it would be necessary to bring a proceeding to 
obtain a subpoena, Miguel M. responded “no, I think they could issue a subpoena for 
these records under their authority under the Mental Hygiene Law.”162  Justice Read 
later pressed Dr. Barron on this point, asking “What’s wrong with the other methods, 
how are they burdensome, or if anything, a subpoena, is it that difficult?”163  When 
Dr. Barron started to respond that obtaining a court order would be burdensome, 
Justice Smith interjected, “They don’t say you have to get a court order, they say a 
subpoena would do. . . as I read it, if you issue a subpoena and give him notice he 
can move to quash the subpoena, but then it becomes his problem, why don’t you 
want to do that?”164  Oddly, Dr. Barron never disputed that it could easily issue a 
subpoena, which is not provided for in the Mental Hygiene Law. 
However, the authority to issue subpoenas is granted under section 2302 of the 
CPLR.165  Subsection a of CPLR 2302 states that “a subpoena to compel production 
of a patient’s clinical record maintained pursuant to the provisions of section 33.13 
of the mental hygiene law shall be accompanied by a court order.”166  Moreover, 
                                                            
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. at 112. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 00:34. 
 160 Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 00:39-00:50. 
 161 Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 07:20. 
 162 Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 07:40. 
 163 Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 14:26. 
 164 Oral Argument, supra note 132 at 15:06-15:15. 
 165 N.Y. C.P.L.R.  2302 (Consol. 2012). 
 166 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(a) (Consol. 2012). 
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CPLR 2302(b) states that “In the absence of an authorization by a patient, a trial 
subpoena duces tecum for the patient's medical records may only be issued by a 
court.”167  Likewise section 3122(a) of the CPLR states that a medical provider need 
not respond to a subpoena unless it is accompanied by a HIPAA authorization.168 
When the references to HIPAA requirements were added to these sections in 2003, 
there was no differentiation between subpoenas issued by a court and subpoenas 
issued by attorneys.  Accordingly, in Campos v. Payne, a Richmond County judge 
ruled that he was without authority to issue subpoenas for medical records without 
the patient’s signed authorization.169  Nonetheless, it was not the New York 
Legislature’s intention “that the requirement for such an authorization apply to trial 
subpoenas.”170  Accordingly, the Legislature recently passed an amendment to 
sections 2302 and 3122 of the CPLR to clarify their intentions.171  The newly 
amended versions, enacted August 3, 2011, specify that HIPAA compliant 
authorizations need to accompany subpoenas other than trail subpoenas issued by a 
court.172  Thus, in the absence of a HIPAA authorization, Dr. Barron cannot simply 
subpoena Miguel M.’s medical records, as Miguel M. and the Justices suggested.  
Moreover, at the time the Court of Appeals issued Miguel M., he could not have 
even obtained a court ordered subpoena without a HIPAA authorization.173  In order 
                                                            
 167 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(b); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a) (Consol. 2012). 
 168 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a)(2). 
 169 Campos v. Payne, 766 N.Y.S.2d 535, 539 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
 170 Sponsor’s Mem. In Support of B. S4586A (2011), available at http://open.nysenate. 
gov/legislation/bill/S4586A-2011. 
 171  Id. 
 172 The amended version of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a)(2) states: 
A medical provider served with a subpoena duces tecum, other than a trial subpoena 
issued by a court, requesting the production of a patient’s medical records pursuant to 
this rule need not respond or object to the subpoena if the subpoena is not 
accompanied by a written authorization by the patient.  Any subpoena served upon a 
medical provider requesting the medical records of a patient shall state in conspicuous 
bold-faced type that the records shall not be provided unless the subpoena is 
accompanied by a written authorization by the patient, or the court has issued the 
subpoena otherwise directed the production of the documents. 
Assemb. B. A7465-A, State Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 4586-A, State S., 2011 
Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi; see also N.Y. 
C.P.L.R.  2302(b) (Consol. 2012) (“In the absence of an authorization by a patient, a trial 
subpoena duces tecum for the patient's medical records may only be issued by a court.”).  
 173 Notably, the New York State Legislature has recently expressed its displeasure at the 
Court’s failure to follow Article 31 of the CPLR. On June 14, 2011, the Assembly passed the 
Personal Healthcare Information Privacy Act, stating that “In its decision of Arons v. 
Jutkowitz 9 NY 3d 393 (2007) the Court of Appeals ignored the rules of Article 31 and by 
judicial fiat created a new rule. This bill would correct that ill-advised decision.”  Sponsor’s  
Mem., Assemb.  B. 694A, available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/.  The Act, which has 
not yet been passed by the Senate, would add a subsection c-1 to CPLR 3102 prohibiting ex 
parte interviews with healthcare providers of any other party in a personal injury, malpractice, 
or wrongful death action.  Assemb. B. A694, State Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.Y. 2011), 
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/. 
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to comply with CPLR 2302, Dr. Barron would have had to obtain a court order 
directing Miguel M. to provide the HIPAA authorization for his medical records to 
accompany the subpoena (though arguably there would be no use for the subpoena 
once the authorization was obtained).  The emphasis the Court placed on the 
availability of an unburdensome, alternative method for obtaining medical records 
during oral argument and in its decision suggests that it may have reached a different 
outcome on the suppression issue if the provisions of CPLR 2302 had been brought 
to its attention. 
In terms of the suppression issue, at first glance, Miguel M. seems inconsistent 
with existing jurisprudence.  Unfortunately, the decision contains little analysis to 
explain the Court’s determination of the issue and no citations in support of its 
decision to suppress.174   This is likely due to the fact that when the Court ruled on 
the issue, neither the trial court nor the appellate division had addressed it; both 
lower courts found no violation of HIPAA, and accordingly it was not vigorously 
briefed and argued by the parties on appeal.175  However, by considering the facts of 
the case the jurisprudence can be harmonized.  
One of the most important facts in Miguel M. is that the medical evidence 
unlawfully obtained consisted of psychiatric records.  In this sense, its outcome is 
consistent with prevailing notions that mental health records are extremely sensitive 
and deserving of protection.  As found in O’Connor, “information about a person’s 
psychiatric health and substance-abuse history in particular, is information of the 
most intimate kind.”176  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
unique nature of this information by creating a psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee v. 
Redmond.177  Notably, the Privacy Rule treats psychotherapy notes with “heightened 
protection” above that provided to regular PHI.178 The Secretary explained, “we have 
provided additional protections for psychotherapy notes because of Jaffee v. 
Redmond and the unique role of this type of information.”179  Thus, disclosure 
without a patient authorization is only permitted to the originator of the 
psychotherapy note for purposes of treatment; for the covered entity’s use for its 
own training programs; for the covered entity’s use in defending against a legal 
action brought by the individual; when required by law; for health oversight 
activities with respect to the oversight of the note’s originator; to a coroner or 
medical examiner for the purpose of identifying the deceased individual or 
                                                            
 174 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011). 
 175 In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 2009); Oral Argument, supra note 132. 
 176 O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201(2d Cir. 2005); see also Martin v. Martelli, 554 
N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (“While exposure of medical records may reveal highly 
sensitive and personal information about an individual, the potential depth of privacy violation 
is far greater in the case of mental health records.”);  In re State  (Off. of Mental Health 
Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr.) v. Civil Serv. Emp. Assoc., 430 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1980) 
(stating that a mental health record “is of such a highly personal nature that it should be 
embraced within that special area of protected privacy”). 
 177 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996). 
 178 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462, 82731 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 179 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82652. 
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determining a cause of death; and when it is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious 
and imminent threat to health or safety of a person or the public.180  The exceptions 
permitting disclosure without authorization for judicial and administrative 
proceedings do not apply.181  Considering the jurisprudence suggesting that there is a 
constitutional right to privacy in one’s mental health records,182 In re Miguel M. can 
be harmonized with the rule that evidence will only be suppressed where there are 
constitutional considerations or statutory or decisional authority mandating 
suppression.183  
Another important fact in Miguel M is the relationship between the party 
introducing the unlawfully obtained medical records and the office from which the 
records were obtained.   Again, here the outcome is consistent with the Court’s prior 
statements on the role of suppression.  In People v. Drain, the Court explained: 
The exclusionary rule’s primary function is deterrence of future unlawful 
police activity; the rule has never been viewed as a ‘personal remedial 
right of a party aggrieved’ by the misconduct. This court has long 
recognized, therefore, that the application and scope of the exclusionary 
rule is ascertained by balancing the foreseeable deterrent effect against the 
adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process. 
Consequently, we consistently have refused to suppress relevant evidence 
if little or no deterrent benefit could be anticipated from the exclusion.184 
Likewise, in People v. Greene, the Court declined to suppress evidence obtained 
in violation of CPLR 4505, stating “The primary obligation to comply with CPLR 
4504 is the doctor’s--or, in this case, the hospital’s. To suppress evidence resulting 
from a violation of section 4504 would be to punish the State for a doctor’s or 
hospital's misconduct--a punishment unlikely to deter doctors and hospitals, who 
have little interest in whether criminal prosecutions succeed or not.”185 
As noted above, the petition in Miguel M. was brought by Dr. Barron, in his role 
as the Director of the Department of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital Center.186  The 
                                                            
 180 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2) (2012). 
 181 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82462, 82653 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 182 See O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 183 People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.Y. 2007); People v. Wilder, 712 
N.E.2d 652, 654 (N.Y. 1999); Mosallem v. Berenson, 905 N.Y.S.2d 575, 581 (App. Div. 
2010); Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727 (App. Div. 2009). 
 184 People v. Drain, 535 N.E.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Boyd v. 
Constantine, 613 N.E.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. 1993) (permitting the use of illegally obtained 
evidence in a police disciplinary hearing as “only negligible deterrence would result from the 
exclusion of evidence.”). 
 185 Greene, 879 N.E.2d at 1283; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976) (“[The 
exclusionary rule] is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the 
search or seizure, for any ‘[r]eparation comes too late.’  Instead, ‘the rule is a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent effect….’”) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 186 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. 2011). 
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evidence had been obtained from both Elmhurst and Holliswood Hospital in 
violation of HIPAA by Dr. Garza, the Director of AOT at Elmhurst.187  While the 
decisions do not reveal who released the information, the Elmhurst records had to 
have been released by an employee because the records were in Elmhurst Hospital’s 
custody.188  As Director of the Department of Psychiatry, Dr. Barron can presumably 
influence the policies and management of patient records within the Department of 
Psychiatry.  Accordingly, suppressing Dr. Barron’s evidence based on his hospital’s 
failure to comply with HIPAA is likely to deter the hospital from similar violations 
in the future. 
Because most AOT proceedings will be brought by health professionals and all 
will involve a patient’s mental health record,189 it is not surprising that in Miguel M., 
the Court announced that medical records obtained in violation of HIPAA “are not 
admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.”190  However, the Court did not hold that 
records obtained in violation of HIPAA are always inadmissible.  Notably, its 
decision is void of any broad statements or dicta which could support suppression in 
other types of cases.  In keeping with the frequently quoted rule that “[t]he language 
of any opinion must be confined to the facts before the court,”191 in terms of creating 
a new rule of evidence, Miguel M. should be narrowly interpreted as applying solely 
to AOT proceedings. 
Though Miguel M. may not state a firm rule of evidence for cases outside of 
AOT proceedings, it does provide some guidance on how HIPAA violations should 
be treated.  Its reasoning as to why suppression was appropriate suggests that the 
justification for the HIPAA violation would be considered in ruling on suppression 
motions.  By stating that suppression may not be required in criminal cases, the 
Court also indicated that the type of proceeding would influence whether evidence 
was admitted or suppressed.  
A.  Criminal Trials 
In the context of criminal trials, Miguel M. indicates that it is unlikely a violation 
of the Privacy Rule will lead to suppression of medical evidence.  After noting the 
cases referenced by Dr. Barron (State v. Carter,192 State v. Yenzer,193 and State v. 
Straehler194), the Court stated “[w]e assume it is correct that, in a criminal case, a 
HIPAA Privacy Rule violation does not always require suppression of evidence.  
Indeed we have held that suppression is not required in such a case where evidence 
                                                            
 187 Miguel M., 882 N,Y.S.2d 698, 700 (App. Div. 2009). 
 188 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(a) (Consol. 2012). 
 189 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c),(e) (Consol. 2012). 
 190 Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 112. 
 191 Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y., 193 N.E. 897, 902 (N.Y. 1934); see also 
People v. Anderson, 488 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (N.Y. 1985); Staber v. Fidler, 482 N.E.2d 1204, 
1206 (N.Y. 1985); Banc of Am. Sec. LLC v. Solow Bldg. Co,. 847 N.Y.S.2d 49, 55 (App. 
Div. 2007); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n. v. Urbach, 718 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (App. 
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 192 State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 193 State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 194 State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App. 14, 745 N.W.2d 431 (2007). 
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was obtained as a result of a violation of New York’s physician-patient privilege.”195  
With this language, the Court implicitly approved the analyses in those out-of-state 
criminal cases.   
The out-of-state decisions referenced in Miguel M. relied on the fact that HIPAA 
provided its own remedies to find that suppression of evidence obtained in violation 
of HIPAA was not appropriate.  In Carter a pharmacist revealed prescription records 
to an officer investigating a “doctor shopping violation” without obtaining the 
defendant’s consent. 196  The defendant was then charged with the crime of doctor 
shopping.197  In Yenzer, a receptionist revealed a patient’s dental appointment 
records to a police officer who was attempting to serve a warrant.  When the officer 
attempted service on the defendant at the appointment, the defendant ran, leading to 
charges of obstructing legal process.198  In Straehler, a nurse revealed observations 
about the defendant and the defendant’s statements (made during the course of 
treatment) to a police officer who was investigating a car crash.  This led to driving 
while intoxicated charges against the defendant.199  Each case noted that the 
defendant’s constitutional rights were not at issue.200  Reciting the basic rule that 
suppression is only warranted where evidence has been obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights or where the statute specifically provides for 
suppression as a remedy, each court found it was not proper to suppress the 
evidence.201 
Notably, none of these decisions concerned the type of medical information that 
the Second Circuit has deemed protected by a constitutional right to privacy (i.e. 
mental health records, HIV diagnoses, and substance abuse records).202  While the 
New York Court of Appeals is likely to follow the reasoning in Carter, Yenzer and 
Straehler in most criminal cases, where more sensitive medical information is 
involved there is justification for its analysis to diverge.  Notably, the Court of 
Appeals used tentative language in Miguel M. when distinguishing it from criminal 
cases.203  However, as the HIPAA Privacy Rule was not designed to protect a 
constitutional right to privacy, it is more appropriate to attribute suppression in cases 
involving sensitive medical information to constitutional violations than it is to 
justify the suppression with reference to HIPAA. 
                                                            
 195 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011). 
 196 Carter, 23 So. 3d at 800. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Yenzer, 195 P.3d at 272. 
 199 Straehler, 745 N.W.2d at 433-34. 
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 203  In re Miguel M. v. Barron, 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011). 
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B.  Civil Trials 
In the context of civil trials, Miguel M. suggests that the justification for the 
procurement of the medical evidence at issue is an important consideration.  In its 
decision, the Court expressed its unease at the prospect of parties using unlawfully 
obtained medical evidence as a basis for bringing a civil action.204  Accordingly, 
Miguel M. suggests that where that is the case the medical evidence obtained in 
violation of HIPAA will be suppressed, even outside the context of an AOT 
proceeding.  
However, it is likely the Court of Appeals would find suppression of relevant 
medical evidence inappropriate in certain circumstances.  It has long been held that 
“notwithstanding New York’s strong policy in favor of the [physician-patient] 
privilege, a party should not be permitted to affirmatively assert a medical condition 
in seeking damages or in defending against liability while simultaneously relying on 
the confidential physician-patient relationship as a sword to thwart the opposition in 
its efforts to uncover facts critical to disputing the party’s claim.”205  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals has found that where an individual affirmatively places privileged 
information or conduct at issue, statutory and constitutional rights and privileges are 
deemed waived.206   
The drafters of the HIPAA Privacy Rule specifically endorsed this 
approach, stating:  
 
[its provisions] are not intended to disrupt current practice whereby an 
individual who is a party to a proceeding and has put his or her medical 
condition at issue will not prevail without consenting to the production of 
his or her protected health information.  In such cases, we presume that 
parties will have ample notice and an opportunity to object in the context 
of the proceeding in which the individual is a party.207   
Accordingly, at least one New York supreme court has found that by 
affirmatively raising a party’s own mental or physical condition in a personal injury 
action, that party waives any rights or remedies under HIPAA as to the mental or 
physical conditions asserted in the litigation.208  The court stated that in such cases, 
“the waiver of any HIPAA rights . . .  has the practical effect of assuring [the other 
party] that the state court will not impose any remedy for a purported violation of 
HIPAA, i.e. the type of preclusion that occurred in Keshecki.”209  As placing one’s 
own medical condition at issue in a civil case is seemingly the antithesis of the 
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 205 Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989); see also Clifford v. Denver & 
Rio Grande R.R. Co., 80 N.E. 1094 (N.Y. 1907) (“The patient cannot use this privilege both 
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situation in Miguel M. (where the medical records were obtained to bring the suit), it 
is unlikely the Court of Appeals would have the same aversion to admitting medical 
records when that scenario arises. 
C.  Administrative Hearings 
In re Miguel M. can also provide guidance for administrative hearings, which 
arise out of similar circumstances—an agency bringing an action to enforce its 
legislative mandate.  Though usually civil in nature, administrative proceedings have 
broader rules of evidence.210  The New York State Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) specifies that “[u]nless otherwise provided by any statute, agencies need 
not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts”.211  Likewise, the APA 
empowers agencies to adopt their own rules of procedure for adjudicatory 
proceedings.212  Moreover, the APA empowers agencies to adopt their own rules for 
discovery to the extent and in the manner appropriate for their proceedings.213  And 
agencies are not required to adopt the rules governing discovery sanctions in the 
CPLR, and without having done so are not bound by them.214  Thus, in 
administrative proceedings parties can rely on evidence that might not be admissible 
under the ordinary rules of evidence.215  Significantly, without the application of 
section 3103 of the CPLR, it is more likely that evidence obtained in violation of 
HIPAA will be admitted. 
The Court of Appeals has looked to the deterrence function of suppression in 
deciding whether unlawfully obtained evidence is required to be suppressed in 
administrative hearings.216  For example, in Boyd v. Constantine, where city police 
had uncovered drugs in an unlawful search, that Court found that those drugs were 
admissible in the disciplinary hearing of a state police officer.  Citing the deterrence 
analysis in Drain,217 the Court stated: 
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The Buffalo City Police could not have foreseen, when they searched the 
vehicle, that defendant would be subject to an administrative disciplinary 
proceeding by the Division of State Police. They did not know, prior to 
the search, that defendant was a State Trooper. Nor were the Buffalo City 
police officers acting as agents of the Division of State Police. Thus, only 
negligible deterrence would result from the exclusion of the evidence. On 
the other hand, the suppression of the evidence would have a significant 
adverse impact upon the truth-finding process in administrative 
proceedings concerning police officers involved in drug-related incidents. 
Stated differently, the benefit to be gained from precluding police 
officers, who unlawfully possess controlled substances, from making 
arrests--including arrests for drug-related offenses--clearly outweighs any 
deterrent effect that may arise from applying the exclusionary rule to 
preclude evidence unlawfully obtained by Buffalo City police officers and 
sought to be admitted by the Division of State Police in an administrative 
disciplinary proceeding.218 
Central to its analysis on why suppression would have little deterrence effect was 
the fact that the party seeking to introduce the unlawfully obtained evidence was not 
an agent of the party that unlawfully obtained it.219 In re Miguel M. further supports 
this approach by providing an example of the opposite situation:  where the party 
seeking to introduce the unlawfully obtained evidence worked for, and indeed was 
head of the Department that unlawfully produced it, the Court found suppression to 
be appropriate.220  Thus, the potential deterrent effect of suppression should continue 
to be a factor considered in determining if evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA 
is admissible in an administrative proceeding. 
Whether or not a party has placed his or her medical condition at issue should 
also be a consideration in determining admissibility in administrative hearings.  Like 
the supreme courts, agencies took this position prior to In re Miguel M.  For 
example, in Department of Environmental Protection v. Rodriguez, an administrative 
law judge at the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings found 
that a letter from an employee’s doctor was admissible in the employee’s 
disciplinary hearing.221  The judge stated that “by submitting medical notes and 
claiming that he was sick on the dates in question, respondent implicitly waived his 
right to confidentiality.”222 As discussed above with respect to civil proceedings, this 
approach should continue in administrative proceedings as well. 
                                                            
 218 Boyd, 613 N.E.2d at 514. 
 219 Id. 
 220 In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. 2011). 
 221 Dep’t of Envtl Prot. v. Rodriguez, OATH Index No. 1438/08, 2008 NY OATH LEXIS 
518 (Apr. 29, 2008), modified on penalty, Comm’r Dec. (May 15, 2008), aff’d sub nom 
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 896 N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 2010). 
 222 Id. at 4-5; see also Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ballach, OATH Index No. 1574/08 at 4 (Apr. 
30, 2008), available at http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/08_Cases/08-1574.pdf.  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
As the first Court of Appeals decision on the issue, In re Miguel M. is bound to 
be considered in future cases addressing whether or not it is appropriate to admit 
evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA.  Like the limited statutory and 
constitutional authority supporting suppression when HIPAA violations occur, 
Miguel M. should be viewed as narrow decisional authority, limited to AOT 
hearings.   With respect to other proceedings, however, Miguel M. should not be 
used as a new evidentiary rule, justifying suppression of all evidence obtained in 
violation of HIPAA.  Instead, Miguel M. should stand for the proposition that the 
type and circumstances of a case need to be carefully considered in determining if 
suppression is appropriate.  Special attention should be paid to the type of medical 
evidence at issue, the identity of the parties, and the reason for the introduction of the 
evidence.  In this manner In re Miguel M. can be harmonized with existing 
jurisprudence and be used to provide more equitable outcomes for litigants. 
 
